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This book provides a  helpful way in to current debates about hell in 
analytical philosophical circles, focusing especially on the question 
of whether hell’s existence is compatible with the existence of an 
omniperfect God. buenting’s introduction gives a  summary of each 
paper, notes and explains shared themes and assumptions, and helpfully 
relates today’s debates to earlier seminal works (by marilyn Adams, Hick, 
Walls, Kvanvig, etc.). The papers in the volume are of uniformly high 
quality, but are directed mostly to professional philosophers. So I would 
hesitate to send an undergraduate to this book for an introduction to 
problems about hell, though I think graduate students or faculty could 
use it for that purpose.
because the chapters are each by distinct authors and each make 
a different point, the bulk of this review will simply summarize the main 
claims of each chapter (in the order in which they occur in the book). 
However, I will begin by noting four views that come up for repeated 
discussion throughout the papers. The first is universalism, the view that 
all people are eventually united with God, so that there is no such thing 
as eternal damnation. Virtually all the papers discuss this possibility, and 
two of the papers argue for it. on the second view, annihilationism, some 
people do not go to heaven, but they do not suffer eternally because they 
are annihilated (cease to exist). While frequently mentioned, this view 
has no advocates in the volume, and chapter three argues specifically 
against it. The most popular view by far is the choice model of hell, 
according to which God wants all people to freely enter heaven, but the 
damned prefer not to. Five of the papers explicitly explore, develop, or 
argue for this view, and another two appear to adopt it implicitly. Finally, 
several of the papers explore the claim that unending conscious suffering 
is a just punishment for sin.
1) Thomas Talbott’s “Grace, Character Formation, and Predestination 
unto Glory” presents a universalist interpretation of the Pauline doctrine 
of God’s grace: God has predestined everyone to develop a  perfectly 
morally virtuous character, and this character development results 
from divine grace, not human effort. This may sound like a determinist 
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picture, but Talbott is at pains to show that libertarian freedom has “an 
important role to play both in the emergence of independent rational 
agents and in the process whereby they are finally reconciled to God” 
(24). It seems that on Talbott’s picture, God has determined our final end, 
but not the path we will take to get there. our undetermined choices play 
a role in the formation of our character. Nevertheless, Talbott argues, we 
cannot take credit for our good character when it eventually develops. 
often it results from our bad choices (we learn from mistakes). more 
importantly, because the long-term results of choices depend largely on 
factors beyond our control, we can never know for sure that our good 
choices will result in good character (and we would need to know this, 
Talbott seems to think, in order to deserve credit for our final character). 
This essay is notable for its realism about character formation, and its 
thought-provoking insistence that the most virtuous agents are least 
likely to take credit for their goodness.
2) raymond VanArragon’s “Is it Possible to Freely reject God Forever?” 
defends a choice model of hell against arguments (raised by Talbott) to 
the effect that it is impossible to continually and eternally choose hell over 
heaven. As VanArragon defines it, to reject God forever is to go on sinning 
or acting immorally forever. Talbott’s first objection is that because 
sin  eventually produces bad consequences for the sinner, everyone 
would eventually lose the motivation to sin and turn to God. VanArragon 
nicely points out that while certain sins (say, substance abuse) may fit 
Talbott’s model, others (say, callousness towards the poor and needy) 
do not obviously harm the sinner, and could probably be continued 
indefinitely. Talbott also objects that God would necessarily intervene to 
prevent anyone from damning themselves, just as a loving parent would 
interfere with her child’s freedom if the child were about to do himself 
irreparable harm. In response, VanArragon denies that the damned ever 
make a single choice that irreparably harms them, because God would 
accept them if they repented, and they will always have the capacity to 
repent because God has good reason to preserve their freedom.
3) In ”Annihilationism: A Philosophical Dead end?” Claire brown and 
Jerry Walls revue the main philosophical arguments for annihilationism, 
and find them all lacking. They argue first that annihilation is not 
the inevitable and natural result of fully rejecting God, and that with 
respect to its implications for God’s supremacy, annihilation has no 
advantage over eternal conscious suffering. They also respond to three 
arguments suggesting that eternal suffering is inconsistent with God’s 
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moral character. They claim first, that if eternal suffering is an excessive 
punishment for merely finite crimes, so is eternal non-existence; second, 
that non-existence is not necessarily preferable to existing in hell, since 
the sufferings of hell may be mild (seeming bad only in comparison 
to the glories of heaven); and third, that God would not let the damned 
commit “metaphysical suicide” because God would want to give them 
the chance to repent.
4) on a choice or “natural consequence” model of damnation, God does 
not consign people to hell against their wills; rather, God gives them what 
they want (which is to be left alone). This model seems to conflict with the 
traditional claim that hell is a bad enough place to function as punishment, 
for how can a place truly be a prison if the inmates don’t want to leave? 
In “Compatibilism, “Wantons,” and the Natural Consequence model of 
Hell,” Justin D. barnard argues that the punitive and choice views can fit 
together, if the damned are what Harry Frankfurt calls “wantons”: beings 
who have desires, but no preferences about which of their desires should 
be effective. Such people would not be in hell against their wills, but they 
would still experience regret and have some desire to escape (a desire 
always overpowered by the self-love keeping them there).
5) on an “Issuant” conception of hell, it is not a place of punishment, 
but a  place provided by God out of love for those who reject God 
(Choice models of hell are thus typically issuant conceptions). In “Value, 
Finality, and Frustration: Problems for escapism?” Andrei buckareff 
and Allen Plug discuss three objections to “escapism,” an issuant view 
according to which the damned can repent and leave hell at any time. 
First, in a discussion that overlaps substantially with barnard’s previous 
chapter on “wantons”, they argue that escapist hell would not count as 
unqualifiedly good for the damned. Second, they show that escapism 
does not conflict with the eschatological finality of heaven and hell (the 
doctrine that after a  certain time, all those in either place will never 
leave). Finally, they argue that escapism does not allow God’s plans to 
be frustrated, because God’s purpose is not that all should be in heaven, 
but that all who prefer to be there should be in heaven. It is worth noting 
that the escapist model defended here seems to be shared by the earlier 
chapters by brown and Walls, and VanArragon.
6) In “Hell, Wrath, and the Grace of God,” Stephen T. Davis explores 
possible scriptural and theological support for the issuant choice 
(escapist) model of hell, and also addresses the objection that this 
picture of hell removes its finality. He closes with brief arguments against 
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annihilationism and universalism. This paper defends roughly the same 
position as buckareff and Plug’s paper, but situates it in a much broader 
context; therefore, I recommend reading chapters 4-6 in reverse order (so 
that each of the three papers would be further scrutinizing a suggestion 
made in the prior paper).
7) Davis suggests that God already knows (for the bible predicts it) that 
some people will remain in hell forever (even though they could leave). 
but how is this foreknowledge to be understood? one possibility is 
molinism: prior to creating, God knows what any possible free creature 
would choose to do in any possible choice situation she might face; God 
also knows which creatures and situations God will create; therefore, 
God knows ahead of time what we will do. In “molinism and Hell,” 
Gordon Knight elegantly argues that if molinism is correct, then even if 
damnation is freely chosen by creatures, hell is incompatible with divine 
goodness. For a God who loves individual creatures would never create 
someone who (God knows) will have “an eternal life that is much worse 
than never having existed at all” (112).
8) In “Hell and Punishment,” Stepehn Kershnar argues against the choice 
model of hell, suggesting that God would damn a person only if hell were 
a  just punishment for that person. He then argues that because hell is 
infinite, it would be an unjust punishment for any merely finitely bad 
human character or action(s). Kershnar concludes with brief arguments 
against annihilation, escapism, and ‘mild hell’ views, leaving universalism 
as the only viable option; his argument at this point rests heavily on the 
type of claim that VanArragon (Ch. 2) attacks in his paper – namely, that 
one could reject God forever only if one’s faculties were impaired so as to 
remove moral responsibility.
9) In contrast to the previous chapter, James Cain’s “Why I  Am 
unconvinced by Arguments against the existence of Hell” develops 
an account of hell as eternal punishment and defends it against five 
important objections. In response to the “excessive punishment” 
objection (central to the prior paper), Cain draws on the relativity of 
time to suggest that a punishment could be unending but still finite from 
the point of view of the sufferer (and hence just). He also points out that 
many philosophical discussions of the afterlife implicitly assume that it 
will be pretty much like a continuation of our current existence; but this, 
he rightly emphasizes, is highly questionable, and so we should draw 
firm conclusions about afterlife experience only with great hesitation.
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10) In “Hell and Natural Atheology,” Keith Yandell defends an issuant 
choice model of hell. He denies the common assumption that it would 
have been better for the damned never to have existed. Drawing on 
considerations of the “metaphysical” as well as moral value and dignity of 
human beings, Yandell argues that it is better for the damned themselves 
to continue in their rejection of God than it would be for them not to 
exist; therefore, hell is the best way for God to love them. He also 
emphasizes that because many very bad people die without getting their 
just deserts, divine justice gives theists considerable reason to believe in 
some kind of hell (postmortem punishment).
11) many of the papers in this book refer at some point to C. S. lewis, 
whose little book The Great Divorce is a powerful articulation of the issuant 
choice model. bradley Sickler’s “Infernal Voluntarism and ‘The Courtesy 
of Deep Heaven’” explores lewis’ choice view of hell in more detail, 
relating it to questions about the ultimate fate of non-Christians: because 
God is fair, lewis argues, salvation through Christ must be available to 
all, even those who do not acknowledge it as such. Sickler also defends 
the choice model against three important objections, one being the 
suggestion that a loving God would eventually override the freedom of 
especially recalcitrant sinners, making them choose heaven. Against this, 
Sickler argues that such a transformation would amount to annihilating 
the sinner and replacing him with a doppelgänger.
12) In “birth as a Grave misfortune,” K. Himma argues that if (1) only 
Christians go to heaven, and (2) hell involves eternal suffering, then it is 
morally wrong to have children. by careful appeal to ordinary examples, 
Himma argues that it is morally wrong to have a child when the chances 
are sufficiently high that the child “will invariably suffer severe harm” 
(192). He then argues that given (1) and (2), the odds of any child going 
to hell seem sufficiently high to make conception wrong. Since it is 
intuitively not wrong to have children, Himma concludes that either (1) 
or (2) must be false.
13) “Species of Hell” by John Kronen and eric reitan offers a  very 
perceptive and helpful classification of the various views of hell discussed 
in the book as a whole (for that reason, I think it might be best to start 
with this paper when picking up this volume). each model of hell is 
shown to combine an account of the nature of the evil of hell with an 
account of the cause of this evil. For each of these issues, there are two 
basic options: the  evil in hell could be purely negative – the absence 
of enjoying the beatific vision – or it could involve in addition some 
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positive conscious suffering; likewise the cause can be seen either as 
primarily human choice (God wants to save the damned, but they refuse 
to cooperate), or divine will (for some reason – e.g., justice – God doesn’t 
will their salvation as an end). Kronen and reitan use this classification 
scheme to generate six possible models of hell, and raise difficulties for 
all of them. of special interest here is their point, which I have never 
heard before, that on some models, God responds to sin in a seemingly 
absurd way: by “acting to ensure that this affront to His dignity continues 
for all eternity” (218). While I  found this to be one of the overall best 
papers in the volume, it was also a somewhat frustrating read: the authors 
abbreviated the various positions with letter and number combinations 
rather than name labels, and there were so many positions that I had 
to keep referring back to the original statements of the views in order to 
follow the argument.
The Problem of Hell is an important contribution to current debates 
about hell. because it contains a  number of genuine advances in the 
discussion, it is a  “must read” for anyone seriously interested in these 
issues. I recommend it heartily.
